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The Logic of Concessive Statements
Aharon Grenadir, Touro College, Brooklyn, NY

Introduction
A concessive statement is a compound
statement that suggests and yet denies an
expectation. For example:
(1a) Although Tom studied hard (which
suggests he would pass), he did not pass
the exam.
(1b) Tom did not pass the exam, although he
studied hard. (reversal of the order of the
clauses in the statement)
The parts of a concessive statement are:
• the concessive clause – the clause that implies
the expectation; it usually begins with a
concessive connective such as „although‟ or „even
though‟
• The presumption - a defeasible rule which
expresses the „usual‟ pattern
• the expectation – what is implied by the
concessive clause together with the presumption
• the main clause - denies the expectation; it can
optionally begin with the word „nevertheless‟
In our example:
„Although Tom studied hard‟ is the concessive
clause ;
„People who studied hard usually passed the
exam‟ is the presumption;
„Tom passed the exam‟ is the expectation;
„He did not pass the exam‟ is the main clause that
denies the expectation.
Concessive statements cannot be modeled in
standard First Order Predicate Logic for two
reasons:
a) first, because FOPL does not model sentential
connectives such as „although – nevertheless‟
that are not truth-functional;
b) second, because the FOPL does not model
deductions that are defeasible (which permit
exceptions and reversals of previous
inferences).

The Goal of this Research

Categorizations I and II

Categorization III

Concessive statements appear frequently in
everyday reasoning. They are one of the eleven types
of statement mentioned in the Ramchal‟s Sefer Derech
Tevunos. In addition, in Talmudic discussions, every
statement has a presupposition (hava-amina) and a
conclusion (ka mashma lan).
This goal of this research is to organize the
categorizations of concessive statements that are
stated in the technical literature.
Using the distintinction in lomdus between
dechiyah (overriding a law) and hutrah (removal of a
law), a novel categorization can be added, according
to the type of denial of the expectation by the main
clause. That is the subject of further research.

I. According to How the Main Clause Denies the
Expectation (Direct or Indirect)
In a direct concessive statement, the main clause
is precisely the denial of the expectation:

III. According to the Source of the Presumption
Robaldo et. al. analyze three types of semantic
relation that allow for „denied expectation‟ without giving
rise to contradiction:
a) Causality – the presumption is that there is a causal
link between the situation in the concessive clause and
the expectation, and causality can be blocked
b) Defeasible Implication - necessary conditions are
inherited from some type of prototype, and the
inheritance may have exceptions
c) Correlation – in a case where two events that correlate
or anti-correlate, we have a presumption that if one of
the two events occurs (as stated in the concessive
clause), then the other event is expected to co-occur (or
non-occur). A “surprising” divergence from the trend
leads to denial of the expectation.

The Notation
Our notational convention for distinguishing the
parts of a concessive statement is as follows. We
display in bold red the concessive clause (called C)
that, together with We display in bold blue the main
clause (called D) that denies that expectation. The
concessive connective is underlined. If the
presumption (called P) and the expectation (called E)
are shown, they are displayed in parentheses.
Thus, the generic concessive statement has the
following form:
(2)Although A (and A and P together defeasibly
imply E), (nevertheless) D.
(where D implies not-E)
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(3) Although Fred studied hard, he did not pass the
exam.
Here, the expectation „Tom passed the exam‟, is denied
directly by the main clause „he did not pass the exam‟.
In an indirect concessive statement, the main clause D
implies the denial of the expectation, not-E, by some
form of inference:
(4)

Although he does not have a car, he has a bike.

Here, the presumption that „Normally, a person who
does not have a car is not mobile‟ leads to the
expectation that „he is not mobile‟. The main clause, „he
has a bike‟, implies „he is mobile‟ and denies the
expectation.
II. According to Type of Inference of the Expectation
(Deductive or Abductive)
In all the concessive statements presented so far,
we infer the expectation by a deductive inference from
the assertion of the concessive clause and the defeasible
rule. For example:
(5a) Tom studied hard for the exam
(5b) If a person studied hard for the exam, then
usually that person passed the exam
(5c) Therefore, Tom passed the exam
In an abductive inference, we infer from a
conclusion what might be a reasonable explanation. For
example, if it rained, then the grass is wet. Suppose we
find that the grass is wet. It is invalid in deductive logic
to conclude that it rained. However, the most reasonable
explanation is that it rained.
Here is an example of a concessive statement with
an abductive inference:
(6a) Theo was not exhausted, although he was
gasping for breath.
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The defeasible rule is not “gasping for breath causes
being exhausted”. Rather, the trigger of expectation is
an abductive inference:
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(6b) Usually, the reason for someone gasping for breath
is because he is exhausted
(6c) Theo was gasping for breath
(6d) Therefore (abductively), Theo was exhausted

Examples of Presumption from causation:
(7)

Although it is raining, we are going for a walk.

The rain is a physical cause blocking us going out or
directly reduces the likelihood of our going out for a walk.
Nevertheless, we ARE going for a walk.
(8a) Even though exhaust fans ventilated the building,
the building still smelled of smoke from the fire.
The causal presumption is as follows:
(8b) Exhaust fans that ventilate the building cause the
removal of the smell of smoke from the building
Example of Presumption from defeasible implication:
(9a) Even though penguins are birds, they are not able
to fly.
The ability to fly is inherited from the prototype of birds:
(9b) Typically, birds are able to fly
This expectation is rejected for penguins, which are
exceptions to the defeasible rule.
Examples of Presumption from correlation:
(10) Although the company made money the first year,
it lost money in subsequent years.
The presumption of trend is that a company that makes
money the first year will usually make money in
subsequent years.
(11) Although Benjamin Harrison was the loser in
the popular vote, he won the presidential election
of 1888 in the Electoral College.
The presumption is that the presidential candidate who
wins the most votes is usually the candidate who wins the
election in the Electoral College. The victory of Harrison
is “surprising” given his defeat in the popular vote.

